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The Resolution of the Labor Scarcity Paradox
ABSTRACT
This paper reconciles the apparently contradictory evidence about
American and British technology in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Past studIes have focused on the writings of a number of distinguished British
engineers, who toured the United States during the 1850s and comented
extensively on the highly mechanized state of the manufacturing sector. Other
studies, however, have marshalled evidence that the interest rate was higher,
and the aggregate manufacturing capital stock was lower, in the United States
relative to Britain. We resolve this paradox by noting that British engineers
were most impressed by only a few industries which relied on skilled
workers. Using the 1849 Census of Manufactures, we estimate separate
production functions for the skilled sector and for the remaining, less
skilled manufacturing sector. We find strong relative complementarity between
capital and natural resources in the skilled sector, and relative
substitutability between skilled labor and capital. Using these parameters in
a computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. and British economies
indicates greater capital intensity (or labor scarcity) in the skilled
manufacturing sector, but overall capital scarcity and higher interest rates,
in the U.S. relative to Britain.
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The influence of factor endowments on the pattern and rate of economic
growth is an important theme in economic history and development. In partic-
ular, the rapid expansion of nineteenth—century American manufacturing has
often been attributed, both by observers at the time and later economic
historians, to the influence of abundant land. Most notably, Rothbarth (1946)
and I-Iabakkuk (1962) have argued that the land to labor ratio, which was higher
in the U.S. than in Britain, raised realwages in American agriculture,
thereby increasing the cost of labor to manufacturers. In turn, the higher
wage rate in American manufacturing induced entrepreneurs to substitute
capital for the dearer labor, leading to a pattern of growth more capital
intensive and more rapid than that in Britain.
Temin (1966) formalized the Rothbarth—Habakkuk hypothesis in a simple
neoclassical model of agricultural and manufacturing production. While abun-
dant land in agriculture implied relative labor scarcity in manufacturing, the
model also implied that the U.S. interest rate should have been lower than in
Britain. Because the U.S. interest rate in the antebellum period was in fact
greater than the British rate, he concluded that U.S. had to have been capital
scarce rather than labor scarce in manufacturing. That is, although labormay
ha.ve been dear, capital was even dearer.
This anomalous conclusion provoked a vigorous and enduring controversy.
Those supporting the Rothbarth—Habakkuk view sought to restore the labor
scarcity result in more general models in which all three factors of produc-
tion (labor, capital, and land) are used in the production of both outputs
(Fogel, 1967; Summers and Clarke, 1980).1 On the other hand, Field (1983a, b)2
has marshalled empirical evidence that the U.S. capital—labor ratio was far
below that in Britain. None of these studies, however, provides a plausible
explanation for all of the empirical regularities in the antebellum economy.
The problem with the capital scarcity view of U.S. manufacturing is that one
must simply ignore the reports of many distinguished visitorsto the antebel-
lum United States who found in a number of industries mechanization more
advanced than in Britain, at that time supposedly the most technically devel-
oped and capital rich country in the world. The difficulty with the labor
scarcity hypothesis is that it cannot explain the strong historical evidence
that the aggregate capital—labor ratio in manufacturing was lower, and that
the interest rate was higher, in the United States.
This paper reconciles these apparent contradictions and resolves the long
debate on labor scarcity by distinguishing between manufacturing industries
using primarily skilled workers and those relying on unskilled workers. We
show that the technological compatibility between capital and natural re-
sources in the skilled manufacturing sector provided sufficient incentives to
substitute capital and inexpensive natural resources for skilled labor. This
strong technological complementarity did not extend to the less skilled sec-
tor, however; thus while the skilled sector was relatively capital intensive,
the less skilled sector (accounting for the great majority of total
manufacturing output), and hence the aggregate manufacturing sector, was
relatively capital scarce. Furthermore, this argument is not just limited to
demonstrating that such a theoretical structure could have generated the labor
scarcity result, but is instead firmly based on historical evidence from the
antebellum period.
The British engineers who visited the United States picked out only a few
industries, primarily those employing skilled workers, for special notice.3
Matching those industries with 1850 Census of Manufactures classifications
allows the estimation of two separate production functions, one for "skilled"
industries, and one for "unskilled" industries. These parameters are then
instituted in a three good, four factor computable general equilibrium model
based on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the U.S. economy in
1849. The model is strictly neoclassical, dealing with aggregated factors of
production taken to be the same across countries. Even if the machines, the
nature of skilled labor, and capital—labor relations in manufacturing differed
between America and Britain (e.g., Lazonick, 1981), such complications are not
essential to explaining the labor scarcity result and reconciling the
empirical evidence. However, the standard assumption is made that the United
States and Britain faced the same technology so that the same range of
productive techniques was available to entrepreneurs in both countries (Temin,
1966, pp. 283—284; Habakkuk, p. 215).2 Therefore the model is also
appropriate for Britain as well. By substituting British factor endowments
and then simulating the model, we generate factor returns and factor input
ratios. This simulation allows us to compare the capital—labor ratios in
America and Britain for both skilled and unskilled manufacturing. While
direct quantitative evidence on these factor intensities has not been
available, our model allows us to generate the relevant capital—labor ratios
necessary to resolve the labor scarcity controversy. It is shown that the
model produces results consistent both with the labor scarcity result and with
the existing body of empirical evidence on factor and product prices in both
countries.
Section I surveys the labor scarcity debate, one of the longest lived in
economic history. The model is specified and the data are described in4
SectionII, while the results are presented in Section III. Section IV surnma—
rizes the conclusions.
I.
A number of foreign visitors during the first half of the nineteenth
century commented on the sophistication of equipment in some sectors of U.S.
manufacturing (Habakkuk, 1962, pp. 4—5; David, 1975, pp. 20—21). However, it
wasthe American displays at the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 that pro-
duced widespread surprise at the state of mechanization in so primitive a
country.Many Britons were forced to admit grudgingly, "Yankees are no longer
to be ridiculed, much less despised" (Rodgers, p. 89). Two years later, a
group of English commissioners, charged with reporting on exhibits at the New
York Exhibition and not finding it open on time, took the opportunity instead
to tour about and report on the state of American technology. The Special
Reports to parliament of George Wallis and Joseph Whitworth, as well as the
report of the Select Committee on Small Arms (1854), together constituted
perhaps the most detailed and reliable description available of antebellum
U.S. manufacturing. Joseph Whitworth, one of the most prominent engineers of
his time and the world's foremost manufacturer of machine tools (Rosenberg,
1969, pp. 1, 20), confirmed earlier reports on the advanced state of
mechanization when he characterized U.S. production by "the application of
machinery wherever it has been practicable to manufacturers" (Rosenberg, 1969,
p. 388) and argued that this was the consequence of the scarcity and high
costs of labor (p. 28).S
The effects of this higher labor cost, linked by Rothbarth (1946) and
Habakkuk (1962) to land abundance, was reformulated by Temin (1966) who
attempted to distinguish between the problems of technological practice and
technological progress. Land abundance implied first that U.S. manufacturing
was capital intensive relative to Britain, the "more machines" argument, and
secondly that technical progress was both more rapid and more labor saving in
the U.S., the "better machines" argument. The former he formalized in a
simple two—sector general equilibrium model which, as we have noted, led him
to conclude that U.S. manufacturing must have been capital scarce relative to
Britain because of the higher U.S. interest rate.
Fogel (1967) showed that it was possible to restore the labor scarcity
result in a more complex model based on Cobb—Douglas production functions with
three inputs in each sector rather than the two Temin had specified.3 Elab-
orating on this model, Summers and Clarke (1980) dropped the Temin assumption
that the U.S. was a small country with prices fixed internationally, instead
allowing for less than perfectly elastic product demand. They solved the
model analytically, obtaining the result that labor scarcity in manufacturing
depends on the elasticity of demand for agricultural products --ifdemand
were inelastic then land abundance, by lowering agricultural prices and wages,
would lead to an increased supply of manufacturing labor, thus contradicting
the Rothbarth-Habakkuk hypothesis.4 However, with perfect international
capital mobility so that the interest rate is taken as given, the case which
they argue was historically relevant, the traditional labor scarcity result
was restored.
Other writers have objected to the restrictions of the Cobb-Douglas
production specification, which was imposed a priori without supporting evi-
dence. Most importantly, Rosenberg (1969, 1977) has emphasized the role of6
natural resource abundance in biasing U.S. manufacturing towards capital-
intensive techniques. In an ambitious attempt to reintegrate the "morema-
chines" and "better machines" components of the Rothbarth—Habakkukthesis,
David (1975) developed a theory of induced technicalchange which linked local
technical change and the process of factor substitution. The abundanceof
land or natural resources, taken to have beena relative complement with
capital, encouraged the choice of capital—intensive techniques in manufac-
turing. In turn, the higher wage—rental ratio induced a pattern of localized
technical change such that globally technicalprogress was more rapid and more
labor—saving in the U.S.
Finally, in contrast to the succession of post—Temjri models attempting to
reestablish the Rothbarth—Habakkuk proposition, Field (1983a, b)argued that
American manufacturing was substantially less capital intensive than in
Britain. He supported this argument by comparing estimates ofaggregate
capital stock in the respectiv.e countries for the mid-nineteenthcentury, and
by documenting the speed and intensity of capital operation by U.S.
entrepreneurs. A two-sector, two-region linear Leontief model was then
developed to demonstrate that a higher interest/profit rate would leada
country such as the U.S. to adopt lower manufacturing capital intensity.
The debate on labor scarcity has not been conclusive. The focus has
shifted from Habakkuk's documentation of American and Britishtechnological
development in the nineteenth century to the formulation of general theoret—
ical models assessing the impact of land abundance. There has beentoo much
concentration on comparing alternative models in which labor scarcitymay or
may not occur and too little concentration on empirical evidence to determine
the appropriate model. Indeed, one of the remarkable features ofthis long
controversy is how little attention has been paid to the "facts".5 At a7
minimum, a model explaining (or refuting) the labor scarcity result should be
consistent with the following three empirical regularities for the antebellum
period (which are supported in Appendix A):
1. The United States was relatively capital intensive compared with
Britain only in a limited number of manufacturing industries. These
industries in general required primarily skilled rather than unskilled labor.
2. Both the nominal and the real wage rate were higher in the United
States than InBritain.
3. Both the nominal and the real cost of capital were higher in the
United States than in Britain.
None of the models in the labor scarcity literature can reconcile all
three of these empirical regularities. Temin greatly clarified the issue by
analyzing it in a general equilibrium framework, but by forcing it into the
Procrustean framework of a very simple model, he ignored Habakkuk's fundamen-
tal distinction that U.S. manufacturing was relatively more capital intensive
in only a few industries.6 "In many and probably in most fields of technology
the English were still far ahead of the Americans at this date r1850's]" (p.
5). Why should U.S. entrepreneurs have adopted sophisticated, capital—
intensive technologies relative to Britain in some industries but not in
others? Previous models could not answer such a question because they have
concentrated on demonstrating that the U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole
was labor scarce (or capital scarce), controverting stylized empirical fact
number i. Moreover, previous models have been unable to reconcile general8
labor scarcity with other empirical evidence. While accepting higher U.S.
interest rates, Temin (1966) and Field (1983a, b) were forced to deny the
United States was relatively labor scarce in manufacturing at all. Summers
and Clarke (1980) supported U.S. relative labor scarcity but only by claiming
that real interest rates were lower in the United States.
The model presented in the following section, while limiting itself to
the "more machines" and not the "better machines" problem, will be more firmly
rooted in Habakkuk's original specification of the labor scarcity phenomenon
by distinguishing between two sectors of manufacturing. Because the exten-
sively mechanized industries were also characterized by more highly skilled
workers, we characterize those industries as the skilled manufacturing sector;
the other industries comprise the unskilled sector.8 Our resolution of the
labor scarcity controversy is based on the relative complementarity of capital
and natural resources inputs in the skilled sector.
The complementarity of cheap natural resources provided sufficient incen-
tive for the entrepreneur to invest in the capital—intensive production
process, despite the high interest rates. Thus we can potentially reconcile
the seemingly contradictory evidence that although some industries displayed
ingenuity in the use of labor—saving equipment, the manufacturing sector as a
whole was capital scarce.
II.
The economy of the antebellum United States is characterized here by a
model with three sectors of production ——skilledmanufacturing, unskilled
manufacturing, and agricultural goods, and four inputs ——skilledlabor,9
unskilled labor, capital, and land. Other sectors extraneous to the argument,
services most importantly, are omitted for simplicity.9 Aggregate factor
endowments are fixed, although some intersectoral factor mobility is allowed.
Industries were classed in the skilled sector if they were noted,
primarily by Whitworth and Wallis but also by Habakkuk, as being particularly
intensive in the use of machinery relative to Britain. These include
agricultural implements, furniture and other woodwork, machinery, hardware,
nails, clocks, and guns (Habakkuk, p. 4; Rosenberg, 1969, pp. 170—73, 216,
269, 273, 342, 343). We exclude two manufacturing industries, boots and shoes
and cotton textiles, from our group of skilled industries because the
mechanized production processes involving skilled workers were only a small
proportion of the total industry (see Appendix A for documentation).
We refer to this grouping of industries as the skilled sector, since
their distinctive feature appears to have been a much greater reliance on
skilled labor.'° In 1849, these industries constituted only 7 percent of
total manufacturing output. The 1849 annual wage in these firms was $329,
substantially greater than the $237 average in all other manufacturing and in
large part an indication of a greater concentration of skilled workers.11
Note, however, that the inclusion of an industry in this group depends on
whether it was singled out by Habakkuk and others as being particularly
capital intensive relative to Britain, and not simply on whether industry
wages were above the norm. The skilled sector is taken to hire only skilled
workers, and the unskilled sector is assumed to hire only unskilled workers,
although both labor classes are assumed equally productive in the agricultural
sector..12
Although the industries displaying advanced machinery were held to have
been more capital intensive than their British counterparts, they were not10
especially capital intensive compared with U.S. manufacturing as a whole. In
1849, the capital—labor ratio for this group was $539 as compared with $559
for all other manufacturing.
The skilled and unskilled manufacturing sectors are assumed to have
Mukerji (1962) multifactor production functions that allow the partial elasti-
cities of substitution to differ between pairs of factors. Skilled labor,
capital, and agricultural resources are inputs tn the production of skilled
manufacturing products, while unskilled labor, capital, and agricultural pro-
ducts enter .the unskilled sector. The Mukerji generalization of the CES
function holds the ratio of partial elasticities constant over the entire
range of production. This can be seen by referring to the skilled and un-






where is the partial elasticity of substitution between factors i and j,
isthe constant production function parameter. The equation holds for the
unskilled sector as well. The function is not necessarily linear homogeneous,
though by appropriate scaling of p or Pu, local linear homogeneity can be
assured. Note also that the production function will generally not be
homothetic; thus at constant factor prices, scale effects will cause differing
proportions of inputs to be used. Agricultural production, by which we mean
natural resources processed sufficiently for use either in the manufacturing
sector or for consumption, is taken to be a constant return to scale Cobb—
Douglas function with inputs labor, capital, and farmland. This function is
also shown in Table I.11
The existence of tariffs and transport costs restricted, within a wide
range of prices, US, and British trading possibilities. The ratio of duties
to the value of dutiable imports was over 25 percent in 1850 and higher than
60 percent during some years in the antebellum period; in addition, Habakkuk
found evidence of wholesale markups between 100-150 percent for imported
products (p. 41). The existence of tariffs and transportation costs are,
moreover, necessary to the labor scarcity argument, since they allowed both
higher interest rates and wages in the United States, given the shared
technology.13 There was, however, significant importation ofraw materials
into Britain, accounting for 40 percent of total domestic agriculturalcon-
sumption in 1851. To a lesser extent the Americans exported agricultural
output as well. We therefore include an exogenous import and export sector,
in which consumption expenditures on the agricultural product diverge from
output value by the amount of the fixed import or export flow. In order to
maintain trade balance, an equal value of manufacturing goods is either im-
ported (in the U.S.) or exported (in Britain), with the composition of skilled
and unskilled manufacturing imports and exports determined by theproportional
output in each domestic sector. The demand functions, taken to be independent
of the income distribution, are derived from a CES utility function andare
also presented in Table i.14,15
We next consider the estimation of parameters for the equations specified
in Table I. The nonlinearity of the Mukerji specification precluded robust
estimation of manufacturing production functions, so we adopted the less
restrictive translog production function instead to provide estimates of the
partial elasticities. The translog function was not chosen for the
simulations, however, because of its potential for wandering into non—economic
regions given counterfactual endowments, as well as for potential changes in12
the relative substitution elasticities. Using data from the 1850 Census of
Manufactures, the production function with constant returns to scale and
symmetry imposed was estimated concurrently with two cost share equations for
efficiency (Burgess, 1975, p. 110). The estimating equations may be written
as:
in Q -inA =
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where K, L, and A denote capital, iabor, and agricultural inputs, and MK and
ML are the cost shares of capitai and iabor, in the respective manufacturing
production functions. The parameters satisfy the restrictions
=1 =0 ,i,j=K,L,A. (2)
The equations were estimated for skilled manufacturing on a pooled set of
state data by industry and for unskilled manufacturing on data by state using
the iterative Zeliner-efficient estimator which yields asymptotic maximum
likelihood estimates independent of the choice of which share equations are
included.16 The regression results are reported in Table II; remaining para-
meters may be computed using the symmetry and constant returns to scale
restrictions in (2).
The Allen partial elasticities of substitution implied by the estimated
parameters and evaluated at the sample means are presented in Table iii.17
The substitution elasticity between capital and labor in unskilled manufác—
turing is less than one, a result consistent with other estimates for13
nineteenth-century u.S. manufacturing (Abraniovitz and David, 1973, P. 434;
James, 1981, p. 383). Moreover, the pattern of inequalities in unskilled
manufacturing, KL < KA < LA' is consistent with that for all U.S. manufac-
turing in the late nineteenth century (James, 1981, P. 383).
Skilled labor appears to have been a better substitute for capital than
unskilled labor was, although this inference involves comparing parameters
from different production functions. This result is at variance with some
more recent evidence that skilled labor and capital are relative complements
(Griliches, j969; Hamermesh and Grant, 1979, p. 537),18 Substitution between
agricultural goods (or natural resources) and both skilled and unskilled labor
is elastic, with unskilled labor being the better substitute.
Most importantly for the issues in this paper, the estimates here support
the David-Rosenberg emphasis on the nonseparability of the production function
between capital and natural resources. In both skilled and unskilled
manufacturing, capital and natural resources are relative
complements, KA < LA' although the relative complementarity is much stronger
in the skilled sector. An increase in natural resource inputs implies an
increase in the capital—labor ratio In both sectors (holding factor prices
constant), with a greater increase in the skilled sector.
The influence of natural resource abundance in influencing the choice of
technique in American manufacturing has often been noted. Whitworth himself,
for example, observed that in the U.S., "In no branch of manufacture does the
application of labour-saving machinery produce by simple means more important
results than in the working of wood" (Rosenberg, 1969, p. 343)., Ames and
Rosenberg (1968) extend the argument in discussing the Springfield Armory.
There is evidence which suggests that the woodworking
machines which were popular in America and neglected in
England were not only labour—saving but also wasteful of
wood. Their adoption in America and neglect in England14
may be attributable not only —-orperhaps not even pri-
marily ——todifferences in the capital—labor ratios in
the two countries but rather to the cheapness of wood in
the United States and its high price in England. (p. 831)
Numerous examples of resource—using tendencies, particularly with lumber, in
American manufacturing are cited in Rosenberg (1972) and Hindle (1975).
Probably more significant than the use of greater physical amounts of raw
materials in production was the fact that Mierican resource abundance made for
cheaper energy. Christensen (1981) shows that the cost of both water and
steam power per horsepower was lower in•the United States than in Britain in
the late antebellum period. The combination of inexpensive energy (i.e.,
natural resources) and the strong relative complementarity between natural
resources and capital must have provided a strong impetus for the U.S. skilled
manufacturing sector to substitute away from labor and into capital.'9
Finally, the factor shares in the Cobb—Douglas agricultural production
function are taken from Fogel and Engerman (1974, pp. 131—133) for antebellum
agriculture, and are also presented in Table iii.20
Habakkuk emphasized that industrial labor was not only dearer in the
United States, but also that its supply was less elastic (pp. 1546). We
therefore specify an intersectoral labor supply function of the following
form.
WS '1
Ls = Err] LA (3)
13
LA
where Ls, Lu, and LA are labor supplied in skilled manufacturing, unskilled
manufacturing, and agriculture, respectively, W1, i =S,U,Ais the sector—
specific wage, and y,i=O,,..,3are parameters of the labor supply15
function. Noting that the total supply of labor is assumed fixed, so that
LA +Lu+L5
=L,we can write the partial elasticity of manufacturing and














where CS, and CArepresentthe skilled, unskilled, and agricultural
elasticities, respectively.
The labor supply elasticity in each manufacturing sector is thus roughly
proportional to or y; by varying these parameters, we can impose either
greater or less labor mobility in the U.S. economy. Initially we assume a
labor supply elasticity in the United States equal to .30, a value consistent
with recent estimates for less developed countries (Mundlak, 1978). Capital,
on the other hand, is assumed fixed within the agricultural and aggregate
manufacturing sectors; because we know from historical evidence their actual
levels, we need not simulate them. However, capital is assumed perfectly
mobile between the skilled and unskilled manufacturing sectors.
This model is more Habakkukian In spirit even if not in all exact details
than previous contributions to the labor scarcity debate. However it is still
too simple to reflect the richness of detail and multitudes of conjectures in
Habakkuk's analysis. For example, we neglect the effects of differences in
the price of capital goods across countries,2' as well as those resulting from
greater imperfections in the U.S. labor and product markets, on the choice of16
capital and labor inputs. Habakkuk argued that average profit rates in U.S.
manufacturing may have been high relative to Britain due to local monopoly
power, but that these profit rates would have fallen rapidly as the firm
expanded past local product and labor markets, thereby providing American
entrepreneurs with Incentives for capital—intensive production methods (pp.
68—69, 74, 75). While these possible discontinuities in the rate of return
are not captured in our model, It is nevertheless complex enough to reconcile
the stylized facts of labor scarcity.
Table IV presents the historical evidence on outputs of and factor inputs
employed in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the United States
and Great Britain in the mid—nineteenth century. This date is an appropriate
one to compare the choice of technique in the U.S. and Britain because the
U.S. labor scarcity question has generally been regarded as an issue only for
the antebellum period and it began to be widely discussed in the 1850's.
Quite conveniently, our stylized Mierican and British economies are very
similar in size at this time, both in terms of total output and output per
capita. As would be expected, however, factor endowments differed
dramatically. While the labor forces in each country were quite similar,
there was more than twice as much capital in Britain (Field, 1983a), but only
one—seventh the land.22
Finally, consider the foreign sector. The British economy imported
substantial quantities of natural resource products. The total value of
agricultural products (or natural resources) imported into the U.K. minus re—
exports was £72.5 million for 1851 (Mitchell, 1962, pp. 291—292, 297).23
While there are no data for imports into Great Britain alone in 1851, we note
that in 1829, the destination of 98 percent of total U.K. imports was Britain
(Mitchell, 1962, pp. 289—292). Assuming a similar ratio held in 1851 and17
converting the figures into dollars at the par exchange rate, we find that
imports into Britain amounted to $354.2 million. Similarly, total exports of
crude materials plus crude foodstuffs from the U.S. in 1849 was $94 million.
The computable general equilibrium model is solved in two steps. In the
first stage, the more detailed U.S. data on output, factor supply, and prices
are used to normalize the production and demand functions. For example, using
observed output, capital stock, labor, and agricultural inputs in skilled
manufacturing, along with estimates of the three elasticities of substitution
from Table 1.11, we can solve for p1. p2, p3, 81, 82, and 83. The final
parameter PS IS then set to ensure local linear homogeneity. Prices of all
final outputs are normalized to $1.00 in the initial U.S. equilibrium.
The second stage is to calculate the new equilibrium in Great Britain.
We substitute factor endowments in Britain for those of the U.S., and allow
the model to iterate from the production side to the consumption side and back
again until a fixed point set of equilibrium factor and product prices are
realized. Solving the model in this way ensures local stability, although the
model may fail to converge for extreme parameters or odd starting values. The
model determines sectoral output in Great Britain. Together with the relative
prices determined within the structure of the simulation, and actual British
GNP in 1851, $1297.7 million, we can express British price levels relative to
the U.S. numeraire prices.
III
The simulation results comparing prices and the capital-labor ratio in
the U.S. and Britain are presented in Table V. The factor returns for the18
United States based on 1849 historical statistics are presented in the first
column. Recall that these returns are not the outcome of the simulation, but
rather are parameters implied by empirical evidence on factor income,
aggregate employment, and capital stock. The skilled wage exceeds the
unskilled wage by 39 percent ($329/$237), while the agricultural wage is
substantially less than the unskilled wage. Although the annual unskilled
wage rate of $237 compares favorably with the $253 wage constructedfrom evi-
dence on daily wages by Abbott (1905) and Goldin and Sokoloff (1982),24 the
agricultural, wage is well below estimates of average yearly earnings of farm
laborers. However, the problem here is not so much with the model as a more
fundamental difficulty in reconciling agricultural wages implied by national
product account factor shares with those observed directly; even if all the
proceeds of farm output were paid only to workers, they would have still
received a wage of only $183.25 The gross return to fixed capital in the
skilled and unskilled manufacturing sector, as specified in the 1850 Census,
was 0.45 and 0.43, respectively, figures consistent with higher real interest
and depreciation rates in the U.S. (see Appendix A). The divergence between
the return to manufacturing capital and the lower return to agricultural
capital suggests substantial capital immobility. Although our model does not
allow for capital mobility between agricultural and manufacturing sectors,
expanding the definition of manufacturing capital to include working capital
virtually eliminates the divergence in returns.26
The results in brackets in Table V for the return to capital and for the
capital—labor ratio reflect the adjustment of manufacturing capital to
equalize factor returns, because.in the initial equilibrium the return to
capital in U.S. skilled manufacturing was slightly higher than in unskilled
manufacturing. The parameter values in the brackets therefore correspond to a19
redistribution of capital within the U.S. manufacturing sector to ensure equal
return to capital.
Results for the simulated British economy are described in the second
column of Table V. First note that relative prices and wages between Britain
and the U.S. appear quite reasonable. The prices of skilled and unskilled
manufacturing goods are, respectively, 0.45 and 0.70, while the price of
agricultural products is one-third higher than in the United States. The
British prices of manufactured products are substantially lower than U.S.
prices,but not so low as to preclude the existence of an American manufac-
turing industry once tariffs and transport costs are taken into account. As
noted earlier, the US.tariffin1850 averagedabout 25percent.Transport
costsfor raw cotton over the 1840-1860 period, computed by comparing New York
and Liverpool prices, averaged about 15 percent of the final price (Mitchell,
1962, p. 491; U.S. Historical Statistics, 1975, p. 209), and such a figure for
shipping a bulk, easily transportable commodity is most probably a lower bound
for transport costs in general. The protection of distance would have suffi-
ciently insulated the U.S. skilled manufacturing sector.27
The British wages in skilled and unskilled manufacturing, $207 and $149,
respectively, are 63 percent of the corresponding American wages, a ratio
slightly less than the 76 percent calculated in the Appendix from historical
sources but nevertheless quite close. The British agricultural wage is
calculated to be 26 percent below the unskilled wage rate, which agrees
closely with the reported difference of 32 percent by Lindert and Williamson
(1983). The essential equality of British and U.S. agricultural wages, while
in accord with Adams (1970), understates the true difference in earnings
between U.S. and British agriculture, because the self—employed American20
farmer also received a return to land in contrast with British tenant farmers
and laborers.28
The return to capital in Britain is shown to be 0.16 in both manufac-
turing sectors, and 0.07 in the agricultural sector. The return to capital in
British manufacturing in the model is very similar to the independently cal-
culated return on capital of 0.18 (see Appendix A). There is less information
on the return to capital in British agriculture, but again it seems reasonable
that the simulation indicates a lower relative return to the agricultural
capital.
Note that the model shows the United States to have been more capital
intensive in the skilled manufacturing sector. The British capital-labor
ratio in skilled manufacturing, $413 per worker, is lower than the $539figure
in the United States, while in the unskilled sector therewas far less capital
per worker in the U.S., $559 versus $848 in Britain. The U.S. was more
capital intensive than Britain in the skilled sector, even though overall in
manufacturing it was less capital intensive. Thus the labor scarcity
hypothesis is confirmed by the simulation model.
One might ask next: What are the effects of a change in the stock of
land on the capital—labor ratio in manufacturing? Not surprisingly, the
outcome of the simulation model parallels the results from the simpler Temin
two—sector model. Setting the elasticity of labor supply in the agricultural
sector equal to 0.3 (andy1 =13)allows workers limited mobility between
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The U.S. case (with equal factor
returns, so that the capital—labor ratios are in brackets) in the first column
of Table V can be compared with the third column, which calculatesequilibrium
prices and quantities for the counterfactual U.S., differing from the actual
U.S. only by having a land endowment equal to that of Britain.Reading from21
column 3 to 1, we can see that increasing the land endowment increases both
the wage of the agricultural worker and the capital—labor ratio in both
manufacturing sectors. Such a result is not surprising; the introduction of
an increased endowment of land leads to rising farm wages and migration from
manufacturing into farming. Because the capital stock in all of manufacturing
is fixed, the new manufacturing capital—labor ratio is higher, so the return
to capital falls. In agriculture, on the other hand, the migration of labor
along with increased land causes a rise in the return to capital (allowing for
capital mobi.lity would reduce the magnitude of these effects). While the
direction of change is not surprising, the minimal response of factor prices
to the seven—fold increase in land is noteworthy. The physical marginal
product of agricultural capital and labor rises significantly in response to
the abundant land. However, the lower price of agricultural output, caused by
the increased agricultural production, reduces the wage and the return to
capital (i.e., the value of the marginal product) sufficiently that the
magnitude of changes in the factor returns are quite small (Summers and
Clarke, 1980). Varying only the land endowment in this model therefore
provides results which are consistent with previous studies, but cannot
explain the historical pattern of lower overall capital intensity, a higher
real interest rate, and a higher skilled manufacturing capital—labor ratio in
the United States relative to Britain.
A central focus of Habakkuk was the role of labor supply in explaining
American labor scarcity. Not only was industrial labor dearer in the United
States but its supply was also less elastic, owing to the barriers of high
information and transportation costs (p. 15—16). In addition, he felt that
the relative abundance of skilled workers in the U.S. led to a lower skilled
wage differential. The combination of a lower elasticity of unskilled labor22
supply, a lower perceived skilled wage differential, and complementarity
between skilled labor and capital led Habakkuk to believe that manufacturers
would substitute out of labor and into more capital—intensive production
techniques (p. 25). We can separate the argument into two parts.
Consider first the role of the industrial labor supply elasticity. The
U.S. manufacturing sector, having to attract workers from farming, would have
been more likely to substitute capital for labor when the sectorexpanded,
since the labor intensive methods would have led to yet higherwages. We can
evaluate the. influence of the labor supply elasticity in our simulation model
by posing the question: How would increasing the manufacturing labor supply
elasticities from our assumed value of 0.3 to the counterfactual case of 0.6
have affected the capital—labor ratio in American manufacturing?29 The
detailed results are presented in the first two columns of Table VIII in
Appendix B. As might be expected, increasing the labor supply elasticity
reduces the capital—labor ratio in both sectors of manufacturing; the higher
manufacturing wages attract more workers into manufacturing, thereby driving
down the capital-labor ratios. That is, if United States labor had beenmore
mobile (as Habakkuk suggested the British were), themanufacturing capital—
labor ratio would have been much lower. Conversely, if the laborsupply
elasticity were significantly lower in the U.S. than in Britain, the labor
scarcity result would have been more likely to occur, strengthening the
simulation results in Table V. Note however that varying the laborsupply
elasticity affects the capital—labor ratio levels in both manufacturing
sectors and thus cannot account for U.S. labor scarcity in only the skilled
sector. Differences across countries in labor supply elasticity alone are
neither necessary nor sufficient for a complete resolution to the labor
scarcity debate.23
The second part of Habakkuk's argument distinguishes between skilled and
unskilled workers. He suggests that a lower skilled wage differential in the
United States created an incentive for manufacturers to substitute skilled
workers and capital (taken to have been relative complements) for the inelas-.
tically supplied unskilled workers. This argument clearly relies on the
specification of the manufacturing production function, which in his implicit
model has three inputs ——skilledworkers, unskilled workers, and capital.
Our simulation model cannot address this issue directly, because we separate
manufacturing into two sectors and include natural resources in both produc-
tion functions. There are at least a couple of reasons however to suggest
that such an explanation for labor scarcity is not correct. First, our
regression results (Table II) suggest it was the skilled artisans who were the
relative substitutes for capital, while unskilled workers were relative
complements in U.S. manufacturing. Andrew Ure, for example, observed that
early mechanization involved the substitution of unskilled for skilled labor
(Habakkuk, 1962, pp. 153—154). As a result, imposing a higher British skill
differential reduces, rather than augments, the labor scarcity result in the
simulation model. A 20 percentage point greater skill differential in Britain
(following Habakkuk), presented in the third column of Table VIII, increased
the capital—labor ratio in the skilled sector so much as to eliminate the
labor scarcity result. Second, evidence cited in Appendix A suggests the
skill differential in the United States was no different from that in
Britain. Williamson and Lindert (1980, p. 67) argue that while the skill
premium was lower in the U.S. early in the nineteenth century, it increased
rapidly relative to Britain over the antebellum period. This trend in the
skill differential is consistent with a trend toward labor scarcity in U.S.
skilled manufacturing before the Civil War.24
Neither factor emphasized by Habakkuk, neither the more inelastic indus-
trial labor supply in the U.S. nor the lower skilled wage differential, is
necessary for the greater capital intensity in U.S. skilled manufacturing as
compared with Britain. Indeed, a lower U.S. skill premium weakens rather than
strengthens the labor scarcity result.
Sumers and Clarke (1980) placed considerable importance on the
elasticity of demand for agricultural products. Therefore let us consider the
sensitivity of the labor scarcity result to changes in the elasticity of
substitution. parameter in the utility function. Reducing the substitution
elasticity parameter ()to0.75 (corresponding to a price elasticity of the
demand for food equal to 0.32 in the U.S.) indicates a capital-labor ratio of
$474 in skilled British manufacturing, still below the U.S. ratio of $539.
Increasingto 3.0 (corresponding to a price elasticity of food equal to 1.26
in the U.S.) weakens the labor scarcity result only slightly, to an implied
value for the British skilled sector of $449. The choice of the proper elas-
ticity of substitution in demand is more important for the implied prices and
wages in the simulation model. Either extremely high or extremely low values
oflead to unreasonably low values for British skilled manufacturing product
and agricultural wages.
If it was neither land abundance alone, or differences in labor supply
elasticities, then what does generate the labor scarcity result? Consider
next simulations which compare the U.S. with Britain, rather than the U.S.
with a counterfactual IJ.S. economy. The simulations indicate that the
production function parameters are essential to obtaining the labor scarcity
result. If the manufacturing sectors are characterized by a CES production
function that imposes an equal elasticity of substitution among the three
factors, then the hypothesis of labor scarcity is rejected. When the common25
elasticity of substitution is set to either 0.8 or 1.2, the capital-labor
ratios in British skilled manufacturing was $773 and $791, respectively, as
compared with the U.S. figure of $539. The David—Rosenberg hypothesis
emphasized that capital and natural resources were relative complements in
production. Even though they were in fact relative complements in both the
skilled and unskilled manufacturing sectors, It was the much lower partial
elasticity in the skilled sector (.81 as compared with 1.71 in the unskilled
sector) that dictated the pattern of factor intensity reversal between the
U.S. and Brl.tain. Increasing this parameter to the unskilled value, 1.71, for
example, would imply capital scarcity in both U.S. manufacturing sectors.
(The detailed simulation results appear In Table IX of Appendix B). The
results are somewhat sensitive to the partial elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital in skilled industry as well. Reducing its value
from 1.34 to the equivalent value in unskilled industy, .85, makes Britain
slightly more capital intensive in skilled manufacturing (Table IX).
The necessary conditions for the labor scarcity result therefore depend
on the production parameters in the two manufacturing sectors as well as the
pattern of factor endowments. In particular, the relative complementarity
between capital and natural resources, and the relative substitutability
between capital and labor in the skilled sector, combined with abundant land
and scarce capital, led to the curious phenomenon of labor scarcity.
Iv.
This paper reconciles the apparently contradictory evidence about
American and British technology in the first half of the nineteenth century26
and in doing so resolves the labor scarcity paradox. A computable general
equilibrium model for the U.S. and Britain at mid—century is developed which
follows Habakkuk's emphasis on distinguishing between skilled and unskilled
labor. Using empirically estimated production function parameters and actual
factor endowments, the simulation model supports the existence of limited
labor scarcity in the United States. The sector of manufacturing employing
primarily skilled workers is shown to have been more capital intensive than in
Britain, even though British manufacturing as a whole was much more capital
intensive than in the U.S. Finally, both the real and nominal wage rates and
the return to capital are shown to have been higher in America, a result also
consistent with the empirical evidence.
While the model does indicate that an increase in land promotes labor
scarcity in manufacturing, Temin (1971, p. 177) proves to be ultimately
correct when he observed, "If labor was scarce in American manufacturing this
was not due simply to an abundance of land.1' In addition to land abundance,
the labor scarcity result appears also to depend on differences in production
technology between skilled and unskilled manufacturing. The arguments by
David and by Rosenberg emphasizing the relative complementarity of capital and
natural resources in production are confirmed here. Land or natural resource
abundance in the U.S. promoted greater capital intensity in manufacturing not
so much through its impact on the labor market but rather through its relative
complementarity with capital.3° Moreover, relative complementarity alone is
not sufficient for the labor scarcity result; as we have seen from the skilled
manufacturing sector, capital and natural resources must be strong relative
complements. If the manufacturing production functions are simplified to CES,
the labor scarcity result is lost.27
In similar fashion, the capital—labor substitution relationship is also
important for the labor scarcity result. If skilled labor is no closer sub-
stitution for capital in production than unskilled labor, the greater capital
intensity in U.S. skilled manufacturing disappears. On the other hand, indus-
trial labor supply differences between the U.S. and Britain, emphasized by
Habakkuk, are not crucial to resolving the labor scarcity problem. A more
inelastic supply of labor to manufacturing in the U.S., ceteris paribus, does
lead to greater capital intensity In both the skilled and unskilled sectors in
the model. However, such differences in labor supply elasticities are un-
likely to explain labor scarcity by themselves, because they cannot account
for the lower overall capital intensity in the United States. The other
aspect of Habakkuk's argument, that lower skilled wage differentials in the
United States induced the substitution of skilled labor and capital for the
dearer and less elastically supplied unskilled labor, contradicts the
empirical evidence. First, from the Appendix, the skill differential in the
U.S. was no lower than in Britain, at least by the 1850's; second, from the
estimated production functions, skilled, rather than unskilled, labor was more
substitutable with capital. Thus, if the supply of industrial labor had been
more inelastic in the U.S. than in Britain, this would reinforce the labor
scarcity result, but in itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient con-
dition.
A final unanswered question is, why did labor scarcity go away during the
second half of the nineteenth century? Habakkuk (pp. 126—127) suggested that
increased immigration after the 1840's, by increasing the elasticity of the
labor supply, reduced the incentive for capital—intensive investments. If the
labor supply factors were not central to the labor scarcity result during the
first half of the nineteenth century, it seems implausible that they could28
account for its demise during the latter half. Similarly, Habakkuk's argument
that technical progress in the second half of the century became more
dependent on the autonomous advance of scientific knowledge is neither well
documented nor particularly convincing (pp. 194—195).
The ultimate reason why labor scarcity in U.S. manufacturing ceased to be
noteworthy was that the United States as a whole had, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, became more capital Intensive than Britain. The American
capital—labor ratio in manufacturing, which in 1880 had been slightly below
that in Britain, was by 1890 well above the British ratio ($1535 versus $1176)
(Feinstein, 1972, p. 199; U.S. Census Office, 19O2).3132 The same pattern
held for specific industries; the capital labor ratio in U.S. textiles was
$1963 in 1899, while in U.K. textiles the ratio was, in 1907, $811 at par
exchange rates. Similarly, the 1899 U.S. ratio in iron and steel was about
four times the corresponding 1907 U.K. figure (Great Britain Board of Trade,
1913, pp. 13, 35; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1913).
The disappearance of the labor scarcity question may well have been a
consequence of localized technical change. David (1975), as we have noted,
suggested that the relative complementarity of natural resources (or land) and
capital led to a pattern of local technical change in the United States that
was globally both more rapid and more labor—saving. James (1981) lent support
to this hypothesis by showing that natural resources and capital were indeed
relative complements in U.S. manufacturing for every Census year between 1850
and 1900. Thus the more rapid U.S. rate of labor—saving technical change
lowered the relative price of capital goods during the middle part of the
nineteenth century, thereby accelerating the rate of capital formation in the
manufacturing sector (David, 1977). Just as the combination of land abundance
and the complementarity between natural resources and capital induced the29
antebellum skilled manufacturing sector to choose more capital—intensive
techniques, the "more machines" story, it also promoted rapid and labor—saving
technical change in the manufacturing sector, or the Thetter machines"
story. It was the second half of the Rothbarth—Habakkuk argument, that lo-
calized innovation in both the skilled and unskilled manufacturing sector led
to greater use of capital, that ultimately can explain the disappearance of
the labor scarcity question by the end of the nineteenth century.30
APPENDIX A
Extent of Labor Scarcity
The group of manufacturing industries which we Identify in Section II as
having been more highly mechanized in the United States by the 1850's are
essentially those identified by Habakkuk (p. 4) as areas of American
superiority. Since Habakkuk's classification in turn was based primarily on
the Special .Reports of Wallis and Whitworth (Rosenberg, 1969), we consider in
this section some of their observations on the state of American technology.
It should be reemphasized that they were much more than casual observers;
Whitworth in particular was impressively, perhaps uniquely, qualified to
compare American with British prodUctive techniques. Even though the evidence
here is impressionistic without quantified data to support it, it still
clearly must be reckoned with.
The commissioners most probably focused on best practice or state of the
art technology in the various American industries. That these best practice
firms were not atypical representations is suggested by the fact that higher
depreciation rates (see later in the Appendix) insured that a greater propor-
tion of U.S. factories were of recent vintage.
American woodworking superiority in the antebellum period was well recog-
nized (Rosenberg, 1969, pp. 32-49). Whitworth commented extensively on this
industry ("In no branch of manufacture does the application of labor—saving
machinery produce by simple means more important results than in the working
of wood" p. 343), and singled out agricultural equipment in particular
("Labour—saving machines are most successfully employed in the manufacture of
agricultural implements" p. 343). In addition, Wallis was impressed by the31
manufacture of decorative furniture (".• .exterisjveestablishments exist for
the production of decorative furniture, the constructive portions being for
the most part prepared by machinery by which labour is greatly economised.
." p. 294).
The industries distinguished by their mechanization were not limited to
woodworking. In metal working and hardware, Wallls declared that "In the
finish of the joints great accuracy is obtained, whilst the labour of filing
is saved by grinding the joints of the hinges on stones adapted to the pur-
pose, and driven by steam—power" (p. 269). Whitworth was similarly impressed
with clock manufacturing:
the superiority obtained in this particular manufacture is not owing
to any local advantage; on the contrary, labour and materials are more
expensive than in the countries to which the exportations are made; it
is to be ascribed solely to the enterprise and energy of the manufac-
turer, and his judicious employment of machinery (p. 342; see also
Church, 1975).
Finally, the speed in which skilled gun workers could assemble a rifle
stock, as carefully timed and documented by Whitworth (pp. 364—65), so im-
pressed the British government that they sent a committee on machinery back to
the United States, ultimately to purchase more than 12000 in muzzle arid stock
producing machines.
Not all industries awed the visiting British. Wallis, for example, did
not find particularly advanced technology in industries such as silk (".. .in
the growth and preparation of the raw material, the United States have re-
ceded, and not advanced, since 1844" p. 232). Similarly, production tech-
niques In leather and furs differed "in no important point with the methods
used, or the purposes to which it is applied in Europe." (p. 235) Aside from
these clearly negative comments, many descriptions of the individual32
industries simply lacked any specific comparison ofproduction methods in the
two countries; these industries included woolens andworsted, flax and hemp,
carpets, wearing apparel and standard clothes, and glass and porcelain.
We have excluded a few minor industries fromour skilled sector, despite
mention by the British observers, primarily because therewas no straight-
forward match between the 1850 Census classificationand the observers' cate-
gory. These include fishing net manufacture (p. 353), printing anddyeing (p.
246) and type foundries in printing and publishing (p.240).
Two maj.or industries, boots and shoes and cottontextiles, are sometimes
identified as having been more mechanized in the UnitedStates. While it was
likely that they were more capital intensive than other U.S.manufacturing
industries (Sokoloff, 1984a), we omit them fromour specified group of indus-
tries because American superiority was limited toonly particular production
processes and was not characteristic of the industry as a whole. In bootsand
shoes, lasts were cut using advanced techniques (p. 171), but therest of the
industry was unmechanized. Of the 11,639 workers employedduring the late
1840's by the Lynn, Massachusetts shoe companies,only 321 cut the shoes from
the stock. The remainder were either female binders(7,170), male cordwainers
(4,132) or management. Owing to the aggregated nature of thedata, we there-.
fore include the machine operators with thesewers and cordwainers in the
unskilled sector.
Cotton textiles was another industry meriting noticeby the British
visitors. Wallis noted that ".. .itis often found that a weaver will attend
to four looms in the United States, who, in thesame quality of work, would
attend to only two in England." (p. 216) His observationsare supported by a
comparison of looms per total factory workers in Lowell and the UnitedKing-
dom.In 1850, the ratio of looms to workers in Lowellwas 1.07, while the33
ratio in the U.K. was only 0.76 (Rosenberg, 1969, pp. 308—309; Mitchell, 1962,
pp. 185, 187). However, the ratio of spindles to total factory workers was
far lower in Lowell, 34.5, than the ratio in the U.K. as a whole, 63.4
although this difference may be an overstatement if British factories were
less integrated than those in Lowell. Aside from differences in machine speed
and quality of fabric, it seems clear that Lowell mills were relatively labor
saving in looms, but labor abundant in spinning. Because weaving cannot be
separated from spinning operations in the data, however, we are also forced to
consider the, aggregated industry, cotton textiles, as an unskilled industry.
It is interesting to note that wages for weavers (who were predominately
women) were between 18 and 48 percent higher than spinners in 1839—41 (Ware,
1931, p. 239), suggesting that the factories most readily substituted capital
for the skilled, rather than unskilled workers.
Wage Differences
Extensive impressionistic and quantitative evidence indicates that un-
skilled wages were substantially higher in the United States than in Great
Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. Habakkuk (p. 11)
cites estimates that wages were a third to a half higher, while Adams found
that American skilled workers earned 37 percent more, and unskilled workers 25
percent more than equivalent British workers in 1830. A comparison of 1850
nonagricultural unskilled wage in Britain and the United States (Williamson
and Lindert, 1983, p. 4; Abbott, 1905) indicates that the British wage, valued
at the par exchange rate, was only .76 of the American rate.
Moreover, real wages, nominal wages adjusted by a cost of living index,
were even higher in the United States. The cost of living was lower in the
United States because of the lower prices for agricultural goods, which at
that time constituted the bulk of expenditures in a workingman's budget.34
Using U.S. weights from Hoover's consumer price index (1960, pp. 177-178) and
U.S. and British price data from the Aldrich Report (the British Sauerbeck
price series is reprinted there), we calculate that the real wage for a non-
agricultural worker in 1850 was 32 percent higher in the United States.33
With the much more aggregated budget shares for British laborers reported in
Lindert and Williamson (1983) the U.S. real wage advantage rises to 52 per-
cent.34 'Thus even though nominalwage rates in agriculture were similar in
the U.S. and England (Adams, 1970), the real wage in the U.S. would have been
higher because of the lower cost-of—living index.
There is a substantial amount of evidence on the wage differential for
male skilled workers in Britain and America. Rosenberg (1967), citing
Zachariah Allen's 1829 manual The Science of Mechanics, found that carpenters
in the United States were paid 45 percent, and masons 65 percent above un-
skilled workers. The differential for most machine workers was not as sig-
nificant; between 25 and 42 percent for ordinary machine makers, and 50 to 75
percent for best machine makers.
Zabler (1974) used evidence from iron firms in eastern Pennsylvania to
suggest that the skill differential in the U.S. was not particulary high. He
found a wage premium for skilled workers of only .15 during the period 1821—
1830. The problem common to all of these comparisons, that a large number of
occupations must be divided into only two categories, is most evident in this
study since the "skilled" miller earned less than the "unskilled" filler in 26
of the 31 years recorded. Adams (1970), on the other hand, reported higher
wage differentials of .73 in Philadelphia during the year 1830.
Williamson and Lindert (1980) found a substantial surge in the relative
price of skilled workers from 1816 to 1856. While machinists received a 50
percent differential in 1825, it grew to 90 percent during the 1840's and rose35
to 120 percent in the 1850*s (p. 68). Thewage differential reached its
maximum during the period 1850—60; "(T)hewage structure in urban Massachu-
setts in the 1850's was almost exactly like that in England in 1825. Itnever
again reached that height in the three decades that followed." (p.71)
Using a detailed compilation of army reports listingwages paid to civi-
lians at military forts, Margo and Villaflor (1983) examinedthe skill diffe-
rential paid to carpenters in the United States. Thepremium was highest in
the southern New England states, where, forexample, carpenters in Boston and
New London were paid 73 percent more than laborersduring the late 1830s and
1840s, but the difference declined substantially in the frontierareas.
According to their regression results, carpenters in the west north central
region in 1840 were paid only 20 percent more than the unskilled workers.
Finally, we present evidence on skilled dailywages, by detailed occupa-
tional group, from the Aldrich Report. Theaverages were weighted by the
number of employees reported as receiving thewage, and we calculate the skill
differential by comparing these wages with theaverage wage for male unskilled
workers (also using the Aldrich Report) computed by Abbott(1905). Table VI
presents the results; building trades were paid a premium of 65percent during
1850—51, printing trades a premium of 75 percent, and engineersa difference
of 66 percent.
The evidence suggests then that the skill differential in theUnited
States during the early 1850's was approximately 60 to 70percent in the
eastern states, and somewhat lower in frontier regions.Furthermore, the
decade of the 1850's probably represented a peak in thewage differential
relative to preceding and later years (although seeMargo and Villaflor,
1983). We next turn to studies of British skill differentials.36
Zachariah Allen observed British wage rates during the 1820's as well.
The wages of carpenters were 31 percent above wages of common laborers, while
both masons and ordinary machine makers were paid a 49 percent differential.
The greatest wage premium was paid to best machine makers, who earned 2.62
times the unskilled wage rate (Adams, 1970).
The most detailed source of British relative wage data from around 1850
comes from the series of papers by Bowley and Wood, and compiled by Lindert
and Williamson (1983). Table VI also includes these estimates of British
wages. Ship.builders were paid a premium of 43 percent over nonagricultural
unskilled workers, while building trades and printing trades received a dif-
ferential of 48 and 67 percent, respectively. Although these two skill pre-
miums are less than the corresponding American values from Table VI, engineers
in Great Britain enjoyed a substantially larger differential than engineers in
the U.S. On average, however, the skill differential is about 60 percent, a
value quite similar to the premium in the U.S.
There is little evidence from the late 1840's and 1850's therefore to
support Habakkuk's proposition that the skill differential was less in the
United States than in Britain (pp. 21—22). For both countries, the differen-
tial was approximately 60 or 70 percent in the more industrialized regions.
Since the skill differential was widening in the antebellum United States, the
1850's then may have been the first decade during which the United States had
caught up to Britain in terms of the skill differential.
On the basis of this evidence, we constrain the skill differential in
British manufacturing to be equal to that in U.S. manufacturing in the
model. The premium actually used, 39 percent, represents the difference
between average annual wages in U.S. skilled and unskilled manufacturing. On
the one hand this figure may overstate the "true" skill differential between37
male workers because of the greater proportion of lower—paid women and
children in the unskilled manufacturing labor force;35 on the other hand,
however, the differential may be understated because many of the "skilled"
industries employed less skilled workers and assistants as well, while the
"unskilled" industries similarly employed some skilled workers and foremen.
Although we adopt 39 percent as our aggregate skill differential, the pattern
of results is not particularly sensitive to the level of the skill
differential.
Capital Cost Differences
The real return to capital in manufacturing was significantly higher in
the United States than in Great Britain during the first half of the nine-
teenth century —-bothgross and net, on average, and at the margin. The
average gross return to fixed capital in U.S. manufacturing in 1849 calculated
from Census data was 42.6 percent as compared with 18.0 percent in Great
Britain in 1851 (constructed from Table IV; Deane and Cole, 1969, pp. 143,
152; Lindert and Williamson, 1983, p. 4)•36 The relevant consideration in
choice of technique, the marginal user cost of capital, was higher in U.S.
manufacturing as well.
Summers and Clarke (1980, p. 134) argue that even though nominal rates
were higher in the antebellum U.S. than in Britain the more rapid deflation
rate in Britain implied approximately equal real interest rates over the
period. This assertion is contraverted by Table VII which presents nominal
and expected real interest rates for the two countries averaged by decade for
the 1801-1860 period and is based on the same data used by Summers and
Clarke. Nominal interest rates in the U.S. are represented by yields on New
England municipal bonds and in Britain by yields on 3 percent consols.38
Expected real rates are constructed by adjusting the nominal interest rate by
the anticipated inflation rate ——thepredicted value from a regression of the
present inflation (or deflation) rate on those for the preceding two years
(the Warren—Pearson price index is used for the U.S. and the Rousseaux index
for Britain).37 With the exception of the first two decades, influenced by
the Napoleonic Wars, real interest rates were consistently and significantly
higher in the U.S. than in Britain. Over the whole antebellum period U.S.
real rates averaged 1.13 percentage points higher, and in the "peacetime"
decades of 1821-1860 they averaged 1.61 percentage points (or 46 percent)
greater. Indeed, taking the anticipated rate of price change into account has
virtually no effect on the magnitude of the differential. For the 1821-1860
period the US-GB differential in terms of nominal rates was 1.59 percentage
points and in terms of real rates, 1.61 percentage points.
Furthermore, it seems quite unlikely that the observed differential could
be accounted for entirely by a risk premium.38 Precise measurement of the
premium resulting from a higher possible default risk of American bonds would
be very difficult or impossible. However, we may observe the response to the
defaults in the U.S. in the early 1840's. These defaults were not widely
anticipated, but they caused the differential to increase by only .42 percen-
tage points —-from1.43 percentage points in the 1830's to 1.88 percentage
points in the 1840's. By the 1850's the differential fell to only .18 percen-
tage points above the level in the pre—default decade. This relatively small
response suggests that risk considerations alone cannot explain higher U.S.
interest rates. Real interest rates therefore appear to have been higher in
the United States than in Britain in the period before the Civil War. Such
higher interest rates in the U.S. moreover are consistent with a wide range of
American social and economic phenomena ——fromeating more quickly to holding39
smaller inventories than Europeans (Field, 1983a, pp. 414-415). They are also
consistent with the evidence on international net capital flows which shows
the United States to have been a continual net importer of British capital
(Williamson, 1964, pp. 89—124).
The marginal gross return to manufacturing capital was higher in the
United States, owing to both the higher interest rates and higher depreciation
rates.39 Inresponse to the higher real rate Americans attempted to reduce
capital costs by running their machines and factories longer and faster. In
cotton texti.les, for example, spindle speed was significantly more rapid in
the U.S. and increased substantially as well after 1828 (Habakkuk, 1962, pp.
54—55; Brito and Williamson, 1973, P. 243; Field, 1983a, pp. 412—413). Such
higher utilization, rates were in turn reflected in more rapid rates of depre-
ciation in the U.S.4° Further evidence may be seen in the well-known "flim-
siness" of American capital goods, such as machine tools and woodworking
machinery, relative to British products. Similarly, in railroad and canal
construction Americans produced less durable results than did the British
(Habakkuk, 1962, pp. 86—89). Again, here the construction of less durable,
more rapidly depreciating structures and equipment may be viewed as consistent
with a higher U.S. real interest rate.
Direct calculation of the gross return to manufacturing capital from
national income figures and of a real interest rate series from nominal in-
terest and inflation rates both confirm that the cost of capital services or
return to capital was higher in the antebellum U.S. than in Britain. The
widely noted higher rates of utilization and depreciation of U.S. capital are
consistent with this, and Habakkuk's argument that product and factor markets
were more imperfect in America than in Britain in the early nineteenth century
reinforce this conclusion as well (pp. 63—79).40
APPENDIX B
Table VIII
Prices, Factor Returns, and Capital—Labor Ratios
in the United States and Great Britain:
Tests of the Habakkuk Hypothesis
United States, 1849 United States, 1849 Great Britain, 1851
Labor Supply Labor Supply Skilled Wage
Elasticity =.3 Elasticity =.6 Differential =59%
PS 1.00 .93 .58




WA 103. 105. 120.
rS .46 .43 .16
rU .43 .43 .16
rA .19 .19 .07
(K/L)s 539. 466. 559.
(K/L)u 559. 475. 785.41
TableIX
Prices, Factor Returns, and Capital—Labor Ratios
in the United States and Great Britain:
Varying Skilled Manufacturing Production Parameters
UnitedStates Great Britain Great Britain Great Britain
1849 1851 1851 1851
Base Case Base Case = 1.71 = .85
P5 1.00 .45 .65 .87
PU 1.00 .70 .68 .68
1.00 1.33 1.34 1.35
329. 207. 191. 193.
237. 149. 138. 139.
WA 103. 118. 119. 120.
.46 .16 .17 .16
rU .43 .16 .17 .16
rA .19 .07 .07 .07
(K/L)5 539. 413. 1476. 559.
(K/L)u 559. 848. 712. 776.Notes
1. In Temin's model (1966) only land and laborare used in the production of
agricultural goods, and labor and capital in theproduction of manufactured
goods.
2.By specifying a smooth factor price frontier (as a result ofassuming
common well-defined production functions) we rule out thepossibility of a
factor intensity reversal due to a shift intechnology.In such a case a
higher interest rate (in the u.s., say) might be associated witha more cap-
ital—intensive technology. See Yeager (1976),pp. 323-324 and the discussion
in Field (1983a), pp. 429—431.
3. This point is also argued by Ames and Rosenberg(1968). Such a result
however is not inconsistent with Temin's moregeneral argument (1971) that in
more complicated models the labor scarcity resultmay be possiblebut not
necessarily follow. Only in the simple two sector, two input model is the
general labor scarcity proposition anecessary consequence.
4.Two other conditions must be met as well: 1) the shareof land in agri-
culture must be greater than in manufacturing; 2)manufacturing must use a
higher proportion of the economy's capital than the labor (Summersand Clarke,
p. 132).
5. Some valiant exceptions to this are Uselding (1972), Britoand Williamson
(1973), James (1981), and Field (1983a, b).
6. Ternin (1966, pp. 281—283) is aware of this distinction butdoes not
incorporate it into his model.
7. For example, Earle and Hoffman (1980,p. 1057) flatly and erroneously
assert, "Most American industries used demonstrably more machinery thanequivalent British industries." Their analysis of the laborscarcity question
is particularly confused, but they do find that "thecharacteristic feature of
American capitalism" is "the use of cheap, instead ofexpensive inputs, pro-
vided any differences in productivity are overcome."(p. 1090)
8.The importance of the distinction between skilled andunskilled labor to
the labor scarcity result, developed byHabakkuk, has been noted by Uselding
(1975; 1977, pp. 164—165), Brito and Williamson(1973), and Goldin and
Sokoloff (1982, pp. 755—756). Goldin and Sokoloffemphasize in particular the
use of women-and children in manufacturing as anotherresponse to the problem
of expensive male labor (1982,pp. 742, 755—756; 1983).
9. Moreover, little is known empirically about production in the service
sector, so specification would have had to have been ratherarbitrary. See
James (1978).
10. For example, Field (1980,pp. 162—163) classes the workers in these
industries in the two highest skill categories——balancedand high skills.
11. Part of the difference however reflects thegreater presence of females
in the unskilled sector. Counting the femalewage as .5 of the male wage
(Sokoloff, 1984b), we calculate the annual malewage in the skilled sector as
$325 as compared with $276 in othermanufacturing, still a significant dif-
ference.
12. Restricting the use of skilled labor to skilledmanufacturing and un-
skilled labor to unskilled manufacturing ignores thepossibility of substi-
tuting among skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital ina generalized four
factor production function. The specification of sucha function however
would present a very complex problem. Habakkuk, forexample, quotes Andrew
Ure to the effect that early manufacturinggrowth involved the substitution of
unskilled labor and capital for skilled labor (pp.153—154), but he himselfargued that more capital—intensive production methods requiredmore skilled
labor per unit output than relatively labor—intensiveones (p. 24). Later
writers have focused on one thread or the other ofthis argument. For
example, Williamson and Lindert (1980) assume skilled labor andcapital to
have been relative complements, butHarley (1974) in his study of the choice
of technique in Edwardian industry emphasizes thesubstitution of unskilled
labor and capital for skilled labor.
Nevertheless, in our specification here the unskilled labor market is
still able to influence skilled labor conditions andthe choice of technique
through labor supply channels. In anycase, this characterization is roughly
consistent with empirical evidence and available data donot permit satisfac-
tory estimation of a four factor production function (unskilledlabor, skilled
labor, capital, natural resources).
13. Habakkuk (p. 43) also raises thepossibility that if the tariff was
levied primarily on relatively labor—intensiveimports, it would have raised
real wages relative to capital and thereby shiftedU.S. demand toward products
made by capital—intensive techniques. The antebellumtariff did in fact
increase real wages the most, but its principal effectwas to increase the
returns to both labor and capital at theexpense of land and slaveholders, a
possibility which Habakkuk recognizes in a footnote. (James(1978), p. 248.)
14. Prices are not taken to be fixed at world levelsin spite of the presence
of an international sector. The protection oftariffs and distance makes it
quite reasonable that U.S. producers faced downwardsloping demand curves, and
it is not implausible that British producers facedthem as well. British
manufacturers may well still have been price makers rather thanprice takers
in world markets, while in agriculturecomplete adjustment to the repeal of
the Corn Laws may not yet have occurred. To besure, demand elasticities mayhave been greater than those facing kriericanproducers and if this were the
case the differences between U.S. and Britishoutput and factor prices which
the model predicts will be overstatements.
15. Lack of data on Consumptionpatterns precludes a more detailed specifica-
tion. A similar one for the demand side has beenused by Williamson and
Lindert (1980, p. 225). Rosenberg (1972,pp. 39—51) has argued that Americans
were more disposed to accepting standardized goodsproduced by
mechanization. If this had been thecase, then the model, which assumes no
differences in the nature of demand between Americaand Britain, is biased
against finding labor scarcity in U.S.manufacturing.
16. Value of output is deflated bya regional price index (Coelho and
Shepherd, 1974). Labor input is measured by totalemployment with one ad-
ditional worker per firm added to correct forentrepreneurial labor input
(Sokoloff, 1984b). Atack (1976, p. 279) has shown thatdifferent measures of
labor input, such as taking interstate variationin the sex composition of the
labor force into account, forexample, has only very small effects on para-
meter estimates in nineteenth—century u.s.production functions. Capital
figures used are those reported in the Census ofManufactures, which are
argued by Davis and Gailman (1978, p. 9) to haverepresented market values.
The measure of agricultural goods input,A, is taken as the value of raw
material inputs deflated by a regional index of naturalresource prices (see
James (1981), pp. 385—386). The observationsare weighted by the ratio of the
number of firms in a given state to the total.
17. The Allen partial elasticity of substitutionbetween inputs I and jis
defined as
=(
fjXi/XjXj)(IF..(/IFI)i,j =K,L, Awhere F is the bordered Hessian of theproduction function f and is the
cofactor of the ijth element of F.
18. Williamson and Lindert (1980,P. 223) take this twentieth—century result
to have been the case in the nineteenthcentury as well.
19. Habakkuk (pp. 33—34) considered butrejected the influence of American
resource abundance in accounting for labor scarcity. Hesuggested that away
from the Fall Line supplies ofpower would have been both dearer and less
elastic in fact than in England,contrary to Christensen's later calculations
(1981, p. 322).
20. The production function itselfwas based on data for Southern agricul-
ture, although Fogel and Engerman take the estimated factorshares to have
prevailed in Northern agriculture as well in their relativeefficiency calcu—
lations. We use these estimates rather than Gallman's(1972) which are based
on assumed rates of return to agricultural capital muchlower than the ones in
our model (Table V).
21. Note that if the price of capitalgoods had been higher in the IJ.S., the
capital—labor ratio in U.S. skilled manufacturing would havebeen
overstated. However, somewhat tenuous evidence from 1865on British machine
tools suggests that the capital pricesmay have been roughly comparable
between the two countries by aroundmid-century. The mean price of machines
produced that year by the British firm of Greenwood andBatley was E89 as
compared to £92, the average price of machine tools sold inEngland by the
American firm of Brown and Sharpe (Floud,1976, pp. 113-114). See also note
39.
22. In general, there has been little effortmade to refine these measures of
factor endowments. For example, because of insufficientdata labor forcetotals have not been adjusted for differences incomposition, such as by
converting them into a measure of male equivalent workers (Sokoloff,
1984b).
Differences between slave and free workers interms of hours worked are ne-
glected as well (Fogel and Engerman, 1977,PP. 285—288). Land input is simply
measured in acres, not taking fertility differencesbetween the U.S. and
Britain into account.
23. The natural resource imports
were corn, coffee, sugar, tea, wine, timber,
raw cotton, raw wool, silk, tobacco, flax, hemp,oils, seeds, hides and skins,
dyewoods and. dyestuffs.
24. Abbott (1905) reported daily unskilledwages of $.91. Noting that women
comprised 26 percent of unskilled workers and that theirrelative wage was
approximately 60 percent of men's (although this differentialvaried by
region; Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982),average annual wages for 310 days of work
would have been $253.
25. Budd (1960, pp. 384—385) workingup. from wage data and including implicit
earnings of slaves finds the labor share more than exhaustsagricultural
sector income in 1850, a rather improbable result.Part of this discrepancy
might be the result of assuming that slaveworkers, like free workers, receive
the going wage.
26.In our basic simulation capital is measuredas fixed capital, as reported
by the Census, and working capital is not counted.Bateman and Weiss (1981,
pp. 116, 193—195), allowing for depreciation and addinga correction for
working capital to the denominator of the rate of returncalculation, compute
the 1849 net return to U.S.manufacturing as 22 percent, a figure very close
to the 19 percent rate of return onagricultural capital in the model.
Equality of returns to capital across sectors thereforecould be achieved by
Simply appropriately inflating the figures formanufacturing capital toreflect working capital as well as fixed. Theproblem with using this latter
measure of capital, which would eliminatepossibly theoretically objectionable
divergencies in rate of return acrosssectors, is that there is not a good
measure of working capital in the U.K. Americanentrepreneurs, responding to
higher interest rates, were generally viewedas Conserving on working capital
and holding smaller inventories thantheir British counterparts (Field, 1983a,
pp. 414-415), but we do not know exactly how much lower.Imposing some
undocumented differential in the ratio ofworking to fixed capital across
countries adas an element of arbitrarinessto the comparison, while not
influencing the results. In any case, it should benoted that the higher
return to capital in manufacturing than inagriculture is consistent with the
results of Bateman and Weiss (1981,P. 130).
27. Moreover, the export ofmachinery from Britain was prohibited until 1843
(Habakkuk, 1962, p. 96).
28. This point is also made by Habakkuk(1962, p. 13).
29. We do this computatonally
by fixing y and 2 assuming that the true
elasticity is 0.3. Then we doubley and and solve the simulation model.
30. Note that the focus has shifted fromland abundance increasing the
agricultural wage (Habakkuk) to the influence ofabundant natural resources,
primarily through decreasing the cost ofpower, and thereby spurring
mechanization. By land abundance here thereforewe really mean natural
resource abundance.
31. This calculation of the Britishcapital—labor ratio in manufacturing
assumes the share of manufacturing capital in thegross reproducible capital
stock to have been the same in 1880 and 1890as in 1920.32. Note that a more elastic supply of unskilledworkers after mid—century,
as argued by Habakkuk, would seem to imply a lowermanufacturing capital—labor
ratio in the U.S. rather than a higher one.
33. This figure probably understates the iS,advantage, because firewood and
rents were excluded from the cost of livingadjustments. In both of these
categories U.S. prices should have been lower.
34. This result, of course, ostensibly violateswell known properties of
index numbers. However, the U.S. and Britishweights do not cover the same
range of comodjtjes, the U.S. weights being much more detailed. The results
are consistent, however, in indicating substantially higher realwages in the
U.S.
35. See note 12.
36. These figures are overestimates of the truerate of return because they
omit working capital from the denominator of thetrue rate of return
calculation. See note 28.
37. Summers and Clarke compute realizedor ex post real rates (p. 134),
rather than expected rates which should be the relevantones in the choice of
technique.
38. Summers and Clarke suggest that taking riskfactors into account it may
well have been the case that the real returnon capital in the United Kingdom
may have been actually higher than in the United States (p. 135).
39. Brito and Williamson (1973) emphasize anotherfactor influencing the cost
of capital services, differences in the relativeprice of investment goods in
the two countries. They suggest that due to thetariff the ratio of the price
of capital goods to that of manufacturedconsumption goods was lower in the
U.S. and that the real costs of capital serviceswere in fact lower in the
U.S. as well. To be sure, the relative price ofcapital goods in the U.S. diddecline over the middle part of the nineteenthcentury, but this was not
characteristic of the entire antebellum period (David,1977). Direct evidence
on Brito and Williamson's asserted inequalityrelationship is rather
inconclusive. Sketchy data on American and Britishantebellum machinery
prices preclude detailed comparisons, but theprice difference between U.S.
and British machinery in cottons and woolens didnot appear to be
systematically less than the tariff on manufactured goodsover the 1810-1830
period (Jeremy, 1981, pp. 188, 229). For example, for woolenspinning in the
1820s the British price per spindlewas $.40, while in the U.S. it was
1.25. Habakkuk (1962, p. 106) cites fora later period, the 1840s, the best
English opinion as believing that the same types of machineswere generally
cheaper in Britain than in America (also see note 21).
40. It may be noted that this characterizationof more intense capital use
and hence more rapid depreciation in the antebellumU.S. than in Britain is
reflected in the assumptions underlying theconstruction of capital stock
figures in the two countries. For the U.S. Gallmanassumes a lifetime for
equipment of 15 years and for structures of 50years, while for Britain Fein—
stein takes lifetimes of 40 and 100years respectively (Davis and Gallman,
1978, p. 457; Feinstejn, 1978, pp. 52, 56).Table I
Production, Consumption, and Import—Export Equations
Production



























and is skilled manufacturing output,
is unskilled manufacturing output,
A is agricultural output,
L is labor in sector i,
K1 is capital in sector I,
T is the acres of land, and
ZA is the portion of domestic agricultural (or natural resource)
output not used in domestic manufacture,
is the price in sector i,
Y is the total GNP, and
o., p1, o, e. are production parameters, i =0,1,2,3
Consumption










P is the constant elasticity of substitution betweenany two consumption
goods, and





X -Q (1-rj)E u_ u
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7)
whereE is the total dollar value of natural resource imports (E > 0)or
exports (E < 0), andis the proportion of total manufacturing outputpro-
duced by the skilled sector.
Note: British and Mierican subscripts are suppressed forsimplicity.Table II
Production Function Parameter Estimatees, 1849 United States
(t statistics in parentheses)
aK ________ 1KK 1LL TKL
Unskilled Manufacturing .2748 .2051 .0521 .0723 —.0040
(13.01) (22.20) (1.89) (5.42) (—2.81)
Skilled Manufacturing .3036 .2952 .0554 .0614 -.0266
(14.04) (19.76) (2.74) (3.51) (—1.88)Table III
Parameter Specifications
aKL KA LA
Skilled Manufacturing 1.26 .81 1.34
Unskilled Manufacturing .85 1.71 2.07
81 62 83
Agriculture .58 .17 .25
Demand Functions 1.5
Note: Symbols and subscripts are defined in Table I.Table IV
Output and Factor Endowments of the United States and Great Britain
Outputs:
Gross Agricultural Output
Value Added in Skilled
Manufacturing







































into dollars at the par
United States
Gross Agricultural Output —Gallman(1960), p. 43.
Value Added in Manufacturing —U.S.Census of Manufactures, (1850),
p. 143.
Labor in Agriculture —Lebergott(1964), p. 511.
Labor in Manufacturing —U.S.Census of Manufactures, (1850), p.
143.
Capital in Agriculture —Calculatedfrom Davis and Gallman, (1978),
pp. 18—21.
Capital in Manufacturing —U.S.Census of Manufactures, (1850) p.
143.
Land —U.S.istorical Statistics, (1975), p. 457.
Land in Agriculture




exchange rateTable IV (Cont.)
Great Britain
Gross Agricultural Output —Deaneand Cole, (1969), pp. 166—167.
Value Added in Manufacturing -Deaneand Cole, (1969), pp. 143, 166-
167; Gallman (1960), p. 43; U.S. Historical Statistics (1975), p.
139. Constructed from Value Added in Mining Manufacturing, and
Building by assuming average labor productivity in mining and
building between the U.S. and Great Britain to have been the same.
Working with Lewis's figures (1978, pp. 246—266) produces an estimate
for 1852 of159.5 million (or $776 million), very close to the
figure reported here.
Labor in Agriculture and
Labor in Manufacturing —Deaneand Cole, (1969), p. 143.
Capital in Agriculture and
Capital in Manufacturing —Interpolatedfrom Feinstein, (1978), p.
42.
Land —O'Brienand Keyder, (1978), p. 105.Table V
Prices, Wages, the Return to Capital, and Capital—Labor Ratios
in the United States and Great Britain: Simulation Results
United States, 1849 Great Britain, 1851 United States, 1849
(with 38.8 million
acres)




Wv 237. 149. 232.
WA 103. 118. 91.
r5 0.46 [.43] 0.16 .46
r 0.43 [.43] 0.16 .46
rA 0.19 0.07 .17
(K/L)5 539. [571.] 413. 499.
(K/L)u 559. [558.] 848. 490.
Note: Figures in brackets represent the simulation thatinitially adjusts the
base case U.S. manufacturing capital stockso that the marginal return to
capital is equalized. S, tJ, and A stand for skilledmanufacturing, unskilled
manufacturing, and agriculture, respectively.Table VI
Daily Wages in the United States and Britain, 1850—51
U.S. U.S. British British
Nominal Skill Nominal Skill




Skilled 1.50 (471) 0.65 1.04 0.48
Printing Traties,
Skilled 1.59 (34) 0.75 1.17 0.67
Engineering, Skilled 1.51 (1093) 0.66 1.32 0.87
[Iron Foundry Workers][2.23] [1.45]
Shipbuilders, Skilled 1.00 0.43
Note: Sample size of U.S. workers are inparentheses.
Note: British annual wages are converted todaily ones by assuming (as
Williamson and Lindert do) that employers worked 52 weeksper year, 6 days per week.
Sources: U.S. unskilled wage —Abbott(1905).
U.S. skilled wages -Compiledfrom the Aldrich Report (U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, 1893).
British wages —Williamsonand Lindert (1983), p. 4.Table VII
U.S. and British Real and Nominal Interest Rates, 1801—1860
(in percent)
Nominal Interest Rates Real Intrest Rates
U.S. GB. Differential U.S. G.B. Differential
1801—1810 5.23 4.78 .45 5.26 5.64 -.38
1811—1820 5.20 4.56 .64 5.65 4.94 .71
1821-1830 4.76 3.63 1.13 4.99 3.48 1.51
1831-1840 4.97 3.39 1.58 5.03 3.60 1.43
1841-1850 5.03 3.24 1.79 5.42 3.54 1.88
1851—1860 3.17 1.86 1.86 5.09 3.48 1.61
1801—1860 5.03 3.79 1.24 5.24 4.11 1.13
1821—1860 4.95 3.36 1.59 5.13 3.52 1.61
Sources: Interest rates —Homer(1963), pp. 195—196, 286—287.
Price indices —HistoricalStatistics (1975), p. 201; Mitchell
(1962), p. 471.References
Abbott, Edith (1905), The Wages of Unskilled Labor in the United States, 1850-
1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Abramovitz, Moses, and David, Paul (1973), "Reinterpreting Economic Growth:
Parables and Realities," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
63, pp. 428—439.
Adams, Donald (1970), "Some Evidence on English and American Wage Rates, 1790-
1830," Journal of Economic History 30, pp. 499—520.
___________(1973),"Wages in the Iron Industry: A Comment," Explorations in
Economic History 11, pp. 89-99.
Ames, Edward, and Rosenberg, Nathan (1968). "The Enfield Arsenal inTheoryand
Practice,"Economic Journal 78, pp. 827—842.
Atack,Jeremy (1976),"Estimation of Economies of Scale in Nineteenth Century
UnitedStates Manufacturing and the Form of the Production Function,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University.
Bateman, Fred, and Weiss, Thomas (1981), A Deplorable Scarcity. Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.
Brito, D.L, and Williamson, Jeffrey (1973), "Skilled Labor and Nineteenth
Century Anglo—American Managerial Behavior," Explorations in Economic
History 10, pp. 235-252.
Budd, Edward C. (1960), "Factor Shares, 1850—1910." In Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, ed., Trends in the American Economy in the
Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 30. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 365—406.
Burgess, David (1975), "Duality Theory and Pitfalls in the Specification of
Technologies," Journal of Econometrics 3, pp. 105—21.
Christensen, Paul P. (1981), "Land Abundance and Cheap Horsepower in the
Mechanization of the Antebellum United States Economy," Explorations in
Economic History 18, pp. 309-329.
Church, R. A. (1975), "Nineteenth—Century Clock Technology in Britain, the
United States, and Switzerland," Economic History Review 28,pp. 616—630.
Clark, Victor (1929), History of Manufactures in the United States, Volumes I,
II. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
Coelho, Philip, and Shepherd, James (1974), "Differences in Regional Prices:
The United States, 1851—1880," Journal of Economic History 34,pp. 551-
591.
David, Paul A. (1975), Technical Choice, Innovation, and Economic Growth.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.__________(1977),"Invention and Accumulation in America's Economic Growth: A
Nineteenth—Century Parable." In Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer (eds.),
International Organization, National Policies and Economic Development.
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 179—228.
Davis, Lance, and Galiman, Robert (1973),"The Share of Savings and Investment
in Gross National Product During the 19th Century in the U.S.A." In F.
C. Lane (ed.), Fourth International Conference of EconomicHistory.
Paris: Mouton, pp. 437—466.
___________and__________(1978),"Capital Formation in the United States
during the Nineteenth Century." In Cambridge Economic Histor.y of Europe,
Vol. VII, Part 2. New York: Cambridge University Press,pp. 1—69.
Deane, Phyllis, and Cole, W. A. (1969), British Economic Growth, 1688—1959,
2nd Edition. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversjty Press.
Drummond, Ian (1967), "Labor Scarcity and the Problem of American Industrial
Efficiency in the 1850's: A Comment," Journal of Economic History 27,pp.
Earle, Carville, and Hoffman, Ronald (1980), "The Foundation of the Modern
Economy: Agriculture and the Costs of Labor in the United States and
England, 1800—60," American Historical Review 85, pp. 1055—1094.
Field, Alexander J. (1980), "Industrialization and Skill Intensity: The Case
of Massachusetts," Journal of Human Resources 15,pp. 149—175.
___________(1983a),"Land Abundance, Interest/Profit Rates, and Nineteenth—
Century American and British Technology," Journal of Economic History 43,
pp. 405—431.
___________(1983b),"Or,theUnimportance of Machinery," unpublished
nianuscri pt.
Feinstein, Charles (1972), National Income, Expenditure, and Output of the
United Kingdom, 1855-1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
___________(1978),"Capital Formation in Great Britain." I Cambridge
Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, Part 1. New York:Cambridge
University Press, pp. 28—96.
Floud, Roderick (1976), The British Machine Tool Industry, 1850—1914.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____________andMcCloskey, Donald, eds. (1981), The Economic History of
Britain Since 1700, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fogel, Robert (1967), "The Specification Problem in Economic History," Journal
of Economic History 27, pp. 283—308.
___________andEngerman, Stanley (1974), Time on the Cross, Volume II.
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.Galirnari, Robert (1960), "Commodity Output, 1839—1899." In Conference on
Research in Income and Wealth, ed., Trends in the American Economy in the
Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 30. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 13—67.
___________(1972),"Changes in Total U.S. Agricultural Factor Productivity in
the Nineteenth Century." In Darwin P. Kelsey, ed., Farming in the New
Nation. Washington: Agricultural History Society, pp. 191—210.
Goldin, Claudia, and Sokoloff, Kenneth (1982), "Women, Children, and
Industrialization in the Early Republic: Evidence from Manufacturing
Censuses," Journal of Economic History 42, pp. 741—774.
__________and__________(1984),"The Relative Productivity Hypothesis of
Industrialization: The American Case, 1820—1850," Quarterly Journal of
Economics 44,
Great Britain Board of Trade (1913), Final Report of Production of the United
Kingdom, 1907. London.
Griliches, Zvi (1969), "Capital—Skill Complementarity," Review of Economics
and Statistics 51, pp. 465—468.
Habakkuk, H. J. (1962), American and British Technology in the Nineteenth
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hamermesh, Daniel, and Grant, James (1979), "Econometric Studies of Labor—
Labor Substitution and Their Implications for Policy," Journal of Human
Resources 14, pp. 518—542.
Harley, C. K. (1974), "Skilled Labour and the Choice of Technique in Edwardian
Industry," Explorations in Economic History 11, pp. 391—414.
Hindle, Brooke, ed. (1975), America's Wooden Age: Aspects of its Early
Technology, Tarrytown, N.Y.: Sleepy Hollow Restorations.
Homer, Sidney (1963), A History of Interest Rates. New Brunswick, N. J.:
Rutgers University Press.
Hoover, Ethel (1960), "Retail Prices After 1850." In Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, ed., Trends in the American Economy in the
Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 30, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 141—190.
James, John A. (1978), "The Welfare Effects of the Antebellum Tariff: A
General Equilibrium Analysis," Explorations in Economic History 15,pp.
23 1—256.
___________(1981),"Some Evidence on Relative Labor Scarcity in 19th—Century
American Manufcturing," Explorations in Economic History 18,pp. 376—388.
Jeremy, David (1981), Transatlantic Industrial Revoution: The Diffusion of
Textile Technologies between Britain and America, 1790-1830s.Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.Jones, R. W. (1971), "A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History." In
J. Bhagwati, et al., (eds.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth.
Amsterdam: NoiTIf11olland, pp. 3—21.
Lazonick, William (1981), "Production Relations, Labor Productivity, and
Choice of Technique: British and U.S. Cotton Spinning," Journal of
Economic History 41, pp. 491—516.
Lebergott, Stanley (1964), Manpower in Economic Growth. New York: McGraw—Hill
Book Co.
Lewis, W. A. (1978), Growth and Fluctuations, 1870—1913. London: Allen and
Unwi n.
Lindert, Peter, and Williamson, Jeffrey(1982). "Antebellum Wage Widening Once
Again,". Journal of Economic History 42, pp. 419—422.
_____________and_____________(1983),"English Workers' Living Standards
during the Industrial Revolution: A New Look," Economic History Review
36, pp. 1—25.
Margo, Robert, and Villaflor, Georgia (1983), "Reports of Persons and Articles
Hired: New Evidence on Antebellum Wage Rates, 1819—1844," unpublished
manuscript.
Mitchell, B. R. with Deane, Phyllis, (1962), Abstract of British Historical
Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Montgomery, James (1840), The Cotton Manufacture of the United States
Contrasted and Compared with That of Great Britain. Glasgow:
Mukerji, V. (1963), "A Generalized S.M.A.C. Function with Constant Ratios of
Elasticity of Substitution," Review of Economic Studies 30, pp. 233—236.
Mundlak, Y. (1978), "Occupational Migration out of Agriculture——A Cross—
Country Analysis," Review of Economics and Statistics 60, pp. 392—398.
O'Brien, Patrick, and Keyder, Caglar (1978), Economic Growth in Britain and
France, 1780—1914. London: Allen and Unwin.
Rodgers, Charles (1852), American Superiority at the World's Fair.
Philadelphia: John J. Hopkins.
Rosenberg, Nathan (1963), "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry,
1840—1910," Journal of Economic History 23, pp. 414—443.
___________(1967),"Anglo—American Wage Differences in the 1820s," Journal of
Economic History 27, pp. 221—229.
___________(1969),The American System of Manufactures. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.__________(1972),Technology and American Economic Growth, White Plains,
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
__________(1976),Perspectives on Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
___________(1977),American Technology: Imported or Indigenous?" American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 67, pp. 21—26.
__________(1984),Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rothbarth, E. (1946), "Causes of the Superior Efficiency of U.S.A. Industry as
Compared with British Industry," Economic Journal 56, pp. 383—390.
Sokoloff, Kenneth (1984a), "Investment in Fixed and Working Capital during
Early Industrialization: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms," Journal
of Economic History 44, pp. 545-556.
_________(1984b),"Was the Transition from the Artisanal Shop to the Small
Factory Associated with Gains in Efficiency?: Evidence from the U.S.
Manufacturing Censuses of 1820 and 1850," Explorations in Economic
History 21, pp. 351—382.
Summers, L., and Clarke, R. (1980), "The Labor Scarcity Controversy
Reconsidered," Economic Journal 90, pp. 129—139.
Temin, Peter (1966), "Labor Scarcity and the Problem of American Industrial
Efficiency in the 1850s," Journal of Economic History 26, pp. 277—298.
___________(1971),"Labor Scarcity in America," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 1, pp. 251-265.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1913), Thirteenth Census of the United States,
1910, Volume VIII: Manufactures. Washington: Government Printing Office.
___________(1975),Historical Statistics of the United States. Washington:
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Census Office (1902), Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900, Volume
VII: Manufactures. Washington: Government Printing Office.
U.S. Senate (1859), Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, Statistics of
Manufactures, Ex. document 39, 35th Cong., 2nd sess.
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (1893), Wholesale Prices, Wages, and
Transportation, Senate Report 1394, 52nd Cong., 2nd sess.
Uselding, Paul (1972), "Technical Progress at the Springfield Armory, 1820—
1850," Explorations in Economic History 9, pp. 291—316.
___________(1975),Studies in the Technological Development of the American
Economy during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. New York: Ama
Press.__________(1977),"Studies of Technology in Economic History." In Robert E.
Gailman, ed., Recent Developments in the Study of Business and Economic
History: Essays in Memory o Herman E. Krooss, Research in Economic
History, Supplement 1. Greenwich, Ct.: JAI Press, pp. 159—220.
Ware, Caroline F. (1931), The Early New England Cotton Manufacture. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.
Williamson, Jeffrey G. (1964), American Growth and the Balance of Payments,
1820—1913. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.
___________(1971),"Optimal Replacement of Capital Goods: The Early New
England and British Textile Firm," Journal of Political Economy 79, pp.
1320—1334.
___________(.1980),"Earnings Inequality in Nineteenth—Century Britain,"
Journal of Economic History 40, pp. 457—476.
___________(1982a),"The Structure of Pay in Britain, 1710—1911." In Paul
Uselding, ed., Research in Economic History, Volume 7. Greenwich, Ct.:
JAI Press, pp. 1—54.
__________(1982b),"Was the Industrial Revolution Worth It? Disamenities and
Death in 19th Century British Towns," Explorations in Economic History
19, pp. 221—245.
__________andLindert, Peter (1980), American Inequality. New York:
Academic Press.
Yeager, Leland (1976), "Toward Understanding Some Paradoxes in Capital
Theory," Economic Inquiry 14, pp. 313—346.
Zabler, Jeffrey (1972), "Further Evidence on American Wage Differentials,
1800—1830," Explorations in Economic History 10, pp. 109—117.
_________(1973),"Wages in the Iron Industry: Reply," Explorations in
Economic History 11, pp. 89-99.